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Henderson: Civil Rights: The Americans with Disabilities Act: Turning a Blin

CIVIL RIGHTS: THE AMERICANS WiTH DISABILITIES ACT:
TURNING A BLIND EYE TOWARDS LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Sutton v. UnitedAir Lines,Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999)
Robin L. Henderson*
Petitioners, twin sisters and commercial airlines pilots, had severe
myopia that was fully correctable by contact lenses.' Respondent, a
commercial airline, refused to hire petitioners as pilots because their
uncorrected vision was below the airline's required minimum. Petitioners
filed suit, alleging that respondent violated the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA).3 The ADA prohibits employers from "discriminat[ing] against
a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability.... ."' The
district court granted summary judgment for respondent, reasoning that
petitioners were not disabled under the ADA because, with corrective
lenses, they were not substantially limited in any major life activities.' The

* To my parents, for teaching me that the fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge.
1. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139,2143 (1999). The Petitioners each
had 20/200 or worse in one eye and 20/400 or worse in the other eye. See id. Without contact
lenses, they could not effectively see to drive, watch television, or shop in public stores. See id.
However, with contact lenses, their vision was 20/20, the standard perfect vision. See id.
2. See id. Respondent airline had a policy of requiring pilots to have at least 20/100
uncorrected visual acuity in both eyes. See id.
3. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 96-S-121, 1996 WL 588917, at *1 (D. Colo.
Aug. 28, 1996), aff'd, 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997), aff'd, 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999). Petitioners
alleged that they were disabled because they were substantially limited in the major life activity of
seeing. See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 895. Also, petitioners alleged that respondent rejected them based
on that disability, or because the airline regarded them as having a disability, in violation of the
ADA. See id.
4. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West Supp. 1999). The general rule on discrimination under the
ADA states in full, "No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." Id. Proving "disability" within the meaning of
the ADA is the first element in a plaintiffs prima facie case. See Sutton, 1996 WL 588917, at *2.
The second element is that "he is qualified.., with or without reasonable accommodation.., to
perform the essential functions of thejob." Id. The final element is that the employer terminated the
plaintiff because of the disability. See id. There are three alternative definitions of "disability"
available under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West Supp. 1999). The first prong, which
is discussed in this Comment, defines actual disability as an impairment that substantially limits a
major life activity of an individual. See id.The second prong embraces individuals with a "record
of"such substantially limiting impairments. Id. The third prong protects individuals who have been
"regarded as" having such disabilities by employers. Id. Petitioners claimed to be "disabled" under
the first and third prongs. See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 895.
5. See Sutton, 1996 WL 588917, at *3-5. The district court also held that petitioners failed
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United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.6 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and HELD, whether an individual
is disabled should be determined with reference to the corrective measures
used to mitigate the impairment.'
The ADA defines "disability," in pertinent part, as "a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities" of an individual. 8 However, the ADA does not specify whether
courts must consider mitigating measures used by the individual when
determining whether an impairment "substantially limits" a major life
activity. 9 As a result, federal circuit courts were divided on the question. 0
A major player in the controversy over mitigating measures is the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which has the authority
to issue regulations to implement the ADA's employment provisions."
Seeking to define proper disability analysis, the EEOC issued an
"Interpretive Guidance." 2 It provided that "[the determination of whether
an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made
. . . without regard to mitigating measures .
*...,3 However, this
interpretive rule was not dispositive because defining the term "disability"
was beyond the EEOC's authority, 4 and courts were split on whether to
adopt the EEOC rule.'5 For example, in Gilday v. Mecosta County, the

to state a claim that respondents regarded them as disabled. See id. at *5.
6. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 895 (10th Cir. 1997), aff'd, 119 S.
Ct. 2139 (1999).
7. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2143. The Supreme Court held that petitioners were neither
actually disabled nor "regarded as" disabled under the ADA. See id. Justice Stevens, joined by
Justice Breyer, dissented, stating that the Court should have deferred to legislative history and the
EEOC guidelines. See id. at 2155-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(A) (West 1999). In the instant case, the Supreme Court cited the
EEOC regulations defining "physical impairment," "substantially limits," and "major life activities"
under the ADA. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145 (citing 29 CFR § 1630.2(h)-(j) (1998)). Under the
EEOC regulations, impairments include disorders affecting body systems such as neurological,
respiratory, cardiovascular, and reproductive organs. See id. Substantially limited means, interalia,
that an individual is unable to perform, or is significantly restricted from performing "a major life
activity that the average person in the general population can perform." Id. Major life activities
include functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working." Id.
9. See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 900.
10. See Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 762 (6th Cir. 1997).
11. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2144. The ADA granted the EEOC authority to issue regulations
regarding Title I of the ADA §§ 12111-12117. See id. at 2144-45.
12. See id. at 2145. The Interpretive Guidance was in the appendix to the EEOC's
regulations, and thus, was not binding law. See Gilday, 124 F.3d at 766.
13. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630, App. § 1630.20) (1998)).
14. See id. at 2145.
15. See id. at 2153 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court stated in the instant case that
the term at issue, "disability," was undefined and the EEOC was not authorized to interpret such
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Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the16EEOC's disability analysis
contradicted the plain language of the ADA.
In Gilday, the appellant had diabetes which was controllable through
a strict diet and exercise regimen. 17 The appellant, who was an emergency
medical technician, brought suit against his former employer after he was
fired for "conduct unbecoming a paramedic," which included rudeness. 8
At trial, the appellant testified that his irritability resulted from fluctuations
in blood sugar-a result of him departing from his strict regimen." The
district court granted summary judgment against appellant, holding that the
diabetes was not significantly limiting when controlled. 20 On appeal, the
issue was whether the court should evaluate the appellant's condition with
regard to mitigating measures, or without regard to those measures, as
recommended by the EEOC. 1 The Gilday court held that mitigating
measures should be considered, but reversed, reasoning that the strict

general provisions. See id. at 2145. The majority of courts followed the EEOC Interpretive
Guidelines and held that disabilities should be evaluated without regard to mitigating measures. See
id. at 2143. See, e.g., Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., 136 F.3d 854, 866 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that
a person's disability status is based on his underlying medical condition whether or not it is
ameliorated by treatment or medication); Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 630 (7th
Cir. 1998) (holding that the determination of whether something is an impairment and whether that
impairment limits major life activities is made without consideration of available mitigating
measures); Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937 (3d Cir. 1997)
(determining that the EEOC interpretive guidelines which recommend that disability determination
should be made without considering mitigating measures should be given deference); Roth v.
Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that determination of impairment
must be made without regard to available measures that could mitigate the impairment); Doane v.
City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 1997) (following the EEOC interpretive guidelines which
do not consider mitigating measures); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362 (9th Cir. 1996)
(following the EEOC interpretive guidelines); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516
(11th Cir. 1996) (holding that the EEOC interpretive guidelines which disregard mitigating
measures should be followed).
16. See Gilday, 124 F.3d at 766 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that courts making disability determinations should consider mitigating measures).
Although Judge Moore's opinion appears as the lead opinion, Judge Kennedy provides the court's
opinion with respect to mitigating measures and the EEOC's interpretive guidelines. See id.at 761;
see also Chmielewski v. Xermac, Inc., 580 N.W.2d 823 n.16 (Mich. 1998) (noting that Judge
Kennedy's opinion is controlling regarding the court's treatment of the EEOC guideline). Judges
Kennedy and Guy, a majority of the court, determined that the ADA requires courts to consider an
individual's impairment in light of mitigating measures, in contrast to Judge Moore who accepted
the EEOC guideline approach, which disregards mitigating measures. See Chmielewski, 580
N.W.2d at 823 nn.16,17.
17. See Gilday, 124 F.3d at 761.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 762.
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regimen itself might substantially limit the appellant's major life
activities. 22
In his concurrence, which is presented as the opinion of the court with
respect to mitigating measures, Judge Kennedy relied on the long
recognized principle that an agency's interpretive rule is entitled to "some
deference" only if it was a "permissible construction of the statute. 23 The
Gilday court held that courts should not defer to the EEOC rule because it
misinterpreted the ADA's definition of disability.' First, the court asserted
that the EEOC approach, in effect, eliminated the statute's "substantially
limit[ing]" requirement.' Specifically, the Gilday court reasoned that, by
overlooking mitigating measures, an individual could be disabled even if
no major life activity was, in fact, substantially limited.2 6 Second, the court
stressed that the statute required an inquiry into the individual's present
ability to perform major life activities.27 Yet, instead, the EEOC approach
evaluated a hypothetical person: the plaintiff minus any treatments.28 While
recognizing that the ADA's legislative history supported the EEOC's
position,29 the Gilday court explained that it was unnecessary to consult
that history because the ADA's text was clear.3 The Gilday court
concluded that the EEOC's approach contradicted the plain language of the
ADA and held that no effect should be given to the EEOC's interpretive
rule. 3'

22. See id. at 767. (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also supra,note 16, for a discussion of the
importance of Judge Kennedy's concurrence.
23. Gilday, 124 F.3d at 767 (quoting Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50,61 (1995)).
24. See id. Judge Kennedy concluded that because the EEOC's approach would provide
protection for persons with impairments that were not "substantially limit[ing]," the court should
not give effect to the EEOC's interpretive rule. Id.
25. Id.
26. See id. An example of such a scenario is the diabetic who uses insulin injections. With
the injections, the individual may suffer from no limitations in life activities. However, without the
insulin, the individual could die. Thus, with the insulin, the diabetic is not "substantially limited,"
and thus, is not disabled. However, if the use of insulin is disregarded, the diabetic would be
considered disabled because of the risk of death.
27. See id. The ADA states, "The term 'disability' means, with respect to an individual-a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual .... 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(A) (West 1999). Judge Kennedy explained that,
"[w]hether a plaintiff is disabled is an individualized inquiry which depends upon the particular
circumstances at issue." Gilday, 124 F.3d at 767.
28. See Gilday,124 F.3d at 767. Judge Kennedy reasoned, "I do not believe that Congress
intended the ADA to protect as 'disabled' all individuals whose life activities would hypothetically
be substantially limited were they to stop taking medication." Id.
29. See id.
30. See id.Judge Kennedy stated that, "[w]here the statutory text is unambiguous, however,
as I believe it is here, that ends the matter. '[We] do not resort to legislative history to cloud a
statutory text that is clear."' Id. (quoting Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994)).
31. See id. Judge Kennedy noted, "Of course, no deference is due to agency interpretations
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Unlike the Gilday court, the First Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the
EEOC's approach in Arnold v. UnitedParcelService, Inc.32 In Arnold, the
appellant was also a diabetic but effectively controlled the condition with
insulin injections. 33 The Arnold court noted that the plain language of the
statute was the starting point for interpretation,' 4 but that where the text is
unclear, it must turn to other sources to discern the legislature's meaning.35
Concluding that the ADA was silent as to whether courts should consider
an impairment with or without regard to mitigating measures,36 theArnold
court resorted to the Act's legislative history.37 TheArnold court found that
the House and Senate Committee Reports explicitly stated that determining
whether impairment substantially limits an individual should not be with
regard to mitigating measures. 38 Also, the reports stated that impairments
such as epilepsy or diabetes are disabilities "even if the effects of the
impairment are controlled by medication. 39
Furthermore, the Arnold court emphasized the principle of statutory
construction where remedial legislation, such as the ADA, should be
construed broadly to achieve its purposes." In reasoning that Congress
at odds with the plain language of the statute itself." Id. at 767 (quoting Public Employees
Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989)).
32. 136 F.3d 854, 866 (lst Cir. 1998).
33. See id. at 856.
34. See id. at 857 (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102, 108 (1980)).
35. See id, at 858. "If the text is not unambiguously clear, however, we are obliged to turn
to other sources to discern the legislature's meaning. One important source, of course, is the
legislative history." Id.(citing Strickland v. Commissioner, Maine Dep't of Human Servs., 48 F.3d
12, 17 (1st Cir. 1995) (applying the test of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984))).
36. See id. at 858-59. The Arnold court found that the statutory language in the instant case
was "far from clear." Id. at 858. The Arnold court explained that the statute is unclear because it
does not indicate whether ameliorative treatments should be considered by the court in determining
whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity. See id. at 859. The court stated,
"'he statute certainly does not say 'impairment plus treatment' or 'impairment after treatment' or
'treated impairment;' it just says 'impairment."' Id. (quoting Sicard v. City of Sioux City, 950 F.
Supp. 1420, 1436 (N.D. Iowa 1996)).
37. See id. at 859-61.
38. Id. at 859-60. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 28 (1989), reprintedin 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,451; S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989)).
39. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485 pt. II, at 52(1990); S.REP. No. 101-116, at 22). The
Arnold court noted that both the House and Senate Committee reports specifically include diabetes
as an impairment under the first prong of the ADA's definition of disability. See id. at 860 n.4
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 51-52; S.REP. No. 101-116, at 22).
40. See id. at 861. "It is a 'familiar canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation,'
such as the ADA, 'should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes."' Id. (quoting Tcherepnin
v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)). The Arnold court reasoned that the purpose of the ADA was
to protect individuals with an underlying medical condition, but who are still capable of doing the
job, with or without the help of mitigating measures. See id. (citing, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)
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intended for the ADA's protections to be administered liberally, theArnold
court noted Congress' finding of an estimated 43 million disabled
Americans. 41 The court concluded from this statistic that Congress
apparently intended that the ADA's protections cover a significant portion
of the American populace.42 Thus, the Arnold court accepted the EEOC's
broad approach, finding it consistent with the legislative history and broad
remedial purposes of the ADA.43 Holding that the disability analysis must
disregard mitigating measures,' the Arnold court reversed the district
court's summary judgment against the appellant, reasoning that diabetes
was a substantially limiting impairment. 5
In Washingtonv. HCA HealthServicesof Texas, Inc.,46 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals considered whether a court must regard mitigating
measures in the disability analysis. Like the Gilday court, the Washington
court believed that the most reasonable reading of the ADA was that
mitigating measures must be considered.47 However, like the Arnold court,
the Washington court found the statute ambiguous on its face. 48 Thus, the
Washington court concluded that principles of statutory interpretation
required some deference to the ADA's legislative history and the EEOC
guidelines.49 Yet, neither of those authorities suggested that every

(1994)).
41. See id. at 862 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (West Supp. 1999)).
42. See id.
43. See id. at 866.
44. See id. However, the Arnold court briefly added that it might hold differently in a case
where the impairment was trivial and easily remedied such as myopia. See id. at 866 n. 10. The court
cited a Senate Report which suggested that a "minor, trivial impairment" would not be considered
a disability under the ADA. See id. (quoting S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23).
45. See id. at 866.
46. 152 F.3d 464,467 (5th Cir. 1998).
47. See id. at 470; Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760,767 (6th Cir. 1997)(Kennedy,
J., concurring opinion as the opinion of the court with respect to mitigating measures). The
Washington court noted that "had Congress intended that a substantial limitation be determined
without regard to mitigating measures, it would have provided for coverage under § 12102(2)(A)
for impairments that have the potential to substantially limit a major life activity." Washington, 152
F.3d at 469 n.5. (quoting its previous dictain Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 19192 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996)).
48. See id. at 469.
49. See id. at 470 n.6 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). The Chevron doctrine requires courts to defer to an agency regulation
forguidance in the interpretation of an ambiguous statute. See id.However, the court is not required
to defer to an agency interpretation if it is not a permissible construction of the statute. See id. The
Washington court noted that the EEOC Interpretive Guidelines were not authorized under the ADA;
therefore, they were not entitled to the full degree of deference in the Chevron doctrine. See id. at
469-70 (construing Batterdon v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977)). However, the court concluded that,
although the EEOC's interpretations were not controlling, they were a body of "experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." Id. at 470
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impairment must be considered in its unmitigated state.5 ° The Washington
court decided that whether an impairment should be evaluated in its
mitigated or unmitigated state should depend on the nature of the
impairment and the mitigating measures utilized.51
Therefore, the Washington court held that only "serious" impairments
requiring the use of mitigating measures on a frequent basis, comparable
to those identified by the EEOC and in legislative history such as diabetes,
epilepsy, and hearing impairments, should be considered in their
unmitigated state.52 The appellant in Washington had Adult Stills Disease
and controlled the effects through daily medications. 3 The court reasoned
that the appellant's disease was "serious," and thus, held that mitigating
measures should not be taken into account in assessing whether the
appellant was disabled under the ADA. 4
In the instant case, the Supreme Court addressed, for the first time,5 the
issue of mitigating measures in the disability analysis under the ADA.5 6
Like the Gilday court, the instant Court reached a conclusion based on the
statute's plain language.57 The Court held that the statute's terms required
that mitigating measures be a factor in the disability analysis. 8 The Court's

(quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 65 S. Ct. 161,164 (1944)). Because it concluded that the EEOC
was entitled to some amount of deference, the Washington court balanced several factors to
determine what was the appropriate degree of deference. See id. The factors included "the
circumstances of their promulgation, the consistency with which the agency adhered to the position
announced, the evident consideration which has gone into its formulation, and the nature of the
agency's expertise." Id. (quoting Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. School Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1014 n.20
(5th Cir. 1996)). Applying the test, the Washingtoncourt found that the EEOC's Interpretive Guide
had been a part of its regulations since they were promulgated, and have consistently interpreted
"disability" to mean "without regard to mitigating measures." Id. Further, the legislative history
supported the EEOC's disability analysis, and the EEOC has significant expertise and authority to
promulgate ADA regulations. See id. Thus, the court concluded that the EEOC's Interpretive
Guidelines deserved more than minimal deference. See id.
50. See id.
51. Seeki. at470-71.
52. See id. at 470.
53. See id. at 466. Without the medications, the appellant would be bedridden and unable to
work. See id.
54. Seeid.at471.
55. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999); Washington, 152 F.3d at
467 n.1. The Washington court noted that the issue of whether to regard mitigating measures in a
disability analysis was "a novel question that has not been explicitly resolved by ... the Supreme
court." Id.
56. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146. The instant Court stated that the "decision turns on
whether disability is to be determined with or without reference to corrective measures." Id.
57. See id. at 2146-47; Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 767 (6th Cir. 1997)
(Kennedy, J., concurring opinion as the opinion of the court with respect to mitigating measures).
58. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149.
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reasoning rested on three main arguments.59 First, because the phrase
"substantially limits" was in present indicative verb form, the Court
reasoned that the substantial limitations must actually and presently exist.'
The Court deduced that a corrected or controlled impairment which is not
substantially limiting merely has the potential to be substantially limiting.6 '
Thus, the Court concluded that such an impairment is not a disability.62
Second, the instant Court found that evaluating an individual's
corrected impairment in a hypothetical, uncorrected state defies the
statutory command to examine the major life activities "of such
individual." 63 Determining whether a disability would exist if the
impairment was not corrected would require general facts about the usual
effects of that impairment on the average person. 64 The instant court
reasoned that this type of analysis would create per se disabilities, thereby
nullifying any possible attempt of an individualized inquiry.65
Finally, the instant Court considered the statistical findings, which
Congress enacted as part of the ADA, estimating that 43 million
Americans have disabilities.66 Whereas the Arnold court considered the
figure evidence of Congress' intent to provide broad coverage, the instant
Court concluded just the opposite.67 Examining various reports, including
one authored by the ADA's original drafters,68 the Court emphasized
Congress' knowledge that 100 million Americans had vision impairments
alone. 69 The court reasoned that Congress' inclusion of the 43 million
figure in the ADA's text revealed an understanding that the "disabled"
population excluded individuals with largely corrected impairments.' In

59. See id. at 2146.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 2146-47.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 2147. The instant Court reasoned that the EEOC approach would create a
system in which persons were treated as members of a group. See id. For example, courts would
find almost all diabetics disabled because without treatment they would almost certainly be
substantially limited. See id. Thus, a diabetic would be considered disabled simply because he or
she has diabetes, even if the illness did not impair any daily activities. See id. The instant Court
stated, 'This is contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the ADA." Id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(1) (West Supp. 1999)).
67. See Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854,862 (1st Cir. 1998); Sutton, 119
S. Ct. at 2148.
68. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147-50 (citing Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with
DisabilitiesAct:Analysis and Implicationsofa Second-GenerationCivilRights Statute, 26 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413,434 n.1 17 (1991)).
69. See id. at 2149 (citing from NATIONALADVISORY EYE COUNCIL, U.S. DEPT. OFHEALTH
& HUMAN SERV., VISION RESEARCH-A NATIONAL PLAN: 1999-2003, at 7 (1998)).
70. See id. at 2148.
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sum, the Court concluded that Congress would have cited a much higher
number than 43 million if it intended to include all correctable
impairments.7 The Court added, however, that the mere use of mitigating
measures did not disqualify an impairment from ADA protection.72 Rather,
a disability would exist if an individual was substantially limited in a major
life activity, notwithstanding the corrective device.7 3
The instant Court rejected petitioners' argument that the Court should
defer to the EEOC's disability analysis since the ADA was silent on the
issue of mitigating measures.74 The Court reasoned that it was unnecessary
to consider agency guidelines and legislative history because it found the
statute's language unambiguous.75 Moreover, the Court ruled that the
EEOC's disability analysis was impermissible because it contradicted the
statute by disregarding mitigating measures.76 Therefore, because
petitioners admitted that their vision was not substantially limited with
contact lenses, the Court affirmed the summary judgment for respondent.77
The Supreme Court's holding in the instant case drew a bright line rule
in an area of law that was previously unsettled. 78 The decision mandated
that, in all ADA cases, the disability analysis must consider mitigating
measures.79 Plaintiffs with correctable impairments must prove that the
impairment substantially limits a major life activity, even when corrected. 80
Potentially, even a life-threatening impairment will not be a disability if
either medicine or a device controls the debilitating effects. 8 Thus, more
ADA claims will be dismissed at the threshold stage for failure to show
that the individual is substantially limited in a major life activity in spite
of mitigating measures.82
Apparently, the instant Court's primary concern was that federal circuit
courts and the EEOC were construing the ADA's protection too broadly
by treating correctable impairments as disabilities.83 This was evident in
71. See id. at 2149. In concurring, Justice Ginsburg noted that the findings included in the
ADA that 43 million Americans were disabled and that individuals with disabilities are a discrete
and insular minority were inconsistent with petitioners' "enormously embracing" definition of
disability which included corrected disabilities. Id. at 2152.
72. See id., at 2149.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 2146.
75. See id.
76. See id. at2147.
77. See id. at 2149.
78. See id., at 2149. The Court held that "disability under the Act is to be determined with

reference to corrective measures." Id.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 2160 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2156 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2149.
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the Court's focus on the statute's plain language.84 Similar to the Gilday
court, the instant Court concluded that the statute was unambiguous,
thereby avoiding the need to consult either legislative history or agencies
for interpretive guidance. 5 The Court could have followed the Arnold or
Washington courts and concluded that the statute was ambiguous because
it left "substantially limits" undefined and was silent regarding mitigating
measures.86 Under this approach, the Court could not have ignored the
Act's legislative history, which reveals Congress' intent to exclude
mitigating measures from the disability analysis. In order to narrow the
ADA's coverage, therefore, the Court had to sidestep the statute's
legislative history. 88
Although the instant Court avoided confronting any legislative history
averse to the objective of narrowing the statute's scope, the Court did
resort to some favorable legislative history.89 Specifically, the Court
discussed Congress' finding that there were 43 million disabled
Americans. 9° The Court relied heavily on the background of the figure to
prove that Congress intended to exclude correctable impairments from the
ADA's protection. 91 Yet, the court neglected to reference the Committee
Reports and other records which specifically demonstrate that Congress
envisioned quite the opposite scope of coverage.92
Regardless of the instant Court's goal, the result of their decision was
greater protection of employers' interests, rather than the interests of the
truly disabled. 93 For instance, respondent deniedjobs to petitioners because
84. See id. at 2146-47.
85. See id. at 2155 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 767
(3rd Cir. 1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring opinion as the opinion of the court with respect to
mitigating measures). In the instant case, Judge Stevens noted that "[w]e have traditionally accorded
respect to ... the agencies." Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2155; see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct.
2196,2207 (1998) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944) (reasoning that
courts should defer to agencies implementing a statute for guidance)).
86. See Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 859 (1st Cir. 1998); Washington
v. HCA Health Servs. of Tex, Inc., 152 F.3d 464,469 (5th Cir. 1998).
87. See Arnold, 136 F.3d at 860 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485 at 52; S. REP. No. 101-116
at 22).
88. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
89. See id. at 2147-49.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 2149.
92. SeeArnold, 136 F.3d at 860 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485 at 52; S. REP. No. 101-116
at 22).
93. See Leonard H. Glantz, DisabilityDefinition Mess, NAT'LL.J., Aug. 23, 1999, at A15.
Glantz notes in his article that the result in the instant case ignores the Supreme Court's prior
approach to disability cases. See id. He writes that in Bragdon,about ayear before Sutton, the court
ruled that a person infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is not disabled under
the ADA. See id. (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2197 (1998)). The plaintiff in
Bragdon had not reached the "full-blown" AIDS stage of the illness and was living without any
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of their poor, uncorrected vision.94 The court, however, evaluated their
corrected vision and found that no disability existed.95 The resulting
anomaly was that petitioners denied employment solely because of a
physical impairment, yet were not entitled to protection from disability
discrimination.96 Evidently, the Court wanted to preserve free reign for
employers to make employment decisions based on the physical attributes
germane to a particular job without the fear of an ADA lawsuit.97
The instant Court could have chosen a different means of protecting
employer discretion by emphasizing the "qualified individual" aspect.98
Petitioners would have been required to prove that in spite of a disability
they were otherwise qualified to perform the job. 99 This would have
compelled respondent to show a legitimate reason for its vision policy.' °°
Such an approach would avoid forcing employers to hire truly unqualified
persons, while also furthering the ADA's aim of ridding the workplace of
unfair discriminatory practices.
Yet another option the Court declined was the approach taken by the
Washington court.' 0 ' The instant case was an opportunity for the Court to
follow Washington by differentiating between trivial and serious
impairments." ° The Court could have ruled that petitioners' myopia was
the type of trivial, easily correctable impairment that should be viewed
with reference to mitigating measures.' 03 This would have narrowed the
scope of ADA coverage, without eliminating many serious yet controllable
disabilities. 04 Such an approach acknowledges Congress' intent manifested

manifested symptoms at the time of the ADA action. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2200-01. The
court in Bragdon was willing to expand "major life activities" to include "reproduction," because
that was the only life activity that Abbott claimed was substantially limited. See id. at 2205. In
Sutton, however, the court was unwilling to read the statute in a way that provided protection for
petitioners, even though without correction, they were substantially limited in the major life activity
of seeing. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149.
94. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2143.
95. See id. at 2149.

96. See id. at 2143-44.
97. See id. at 2150.
98. Id. at 2156-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. See id.

100. See id. at 2158 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. See Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Tex., 152 F.3d 464,470-71 (5th Cir. 1998).
The Washington court ruled that some impairments should be analyzed with regard to mitigating
measures and some should not. See id. The instant Court did not make this compromise. See Sutton,
119 S. Ct. at 2149.
102. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2161-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
103. See id.

104. See id. at 2160-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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in legislative history and also gives some deference to the EEOC's
approach. 105
The Supreme Court resolved the split in the circuits by siding with the
minority trend. 106 The result was a sharp turn in the practical force of the
statute. Seemingly, the Court had in mind a goal to narrow the scope of the
ADA's protection and shaped its reasoning to accomplish that end.1 7 The
Court circumvented the Congressional intent documented in the legislative
history and relied on the Act's plain language in authoring a fictional
version of Congressional intent to better suit the Court's purposes. 10 8 Had
the Court desired to interpret the statute broadly, it could have easily done
so by conducting a more principled analysis of the instant case) °9 As the
Arnold court noted, the ADA is remedial legislation which, historically, the
courts have construed broadly."0 Additionally, the Court could have
followed well-established principles of statutory construction by deferring
to legislative history and agency interpretations when statutory language
is unclear. Instead, the Court deferred to its own opinion in a rush to close
the floodgates of the ADA.

105. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 21201 (a)(5) (West Supp. 1999). Congress found that"individuals with
disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including ... overprotective
rules and policies ....
Id. The purpose of the ADA was "to provide a clear... standard[]
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 (b)(1) & (2).
106. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2153 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107. See id. at 2149.
108. See id. at 2160-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. See id. at 2154 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens reasoned that "[t]o the extent that
there may be doubt concerning the meaning of the statutory test, ambiguity is easily removed by
looking at the legislative history." Id. at 2155. "In surveying legislative history we have repeatedly
stated that the authoritative source for finding the Legislature's intent lies in the Committee Reports
on the bill, which 'represen[t] the considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen
involved in drafting and studying the proposed legislation."' Id. (quoting Garcia v. United States,
469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984)). Justice Stevens stated that the Committee Reports on the ADA bill make
it abundantly clear that Congress intended the ADA to cover individuals who could perform all of
their major life activities only with the help of ameliorative measures. See id.
110. See Arnold, 136 F.3d at 861.
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